Abstract
Due to Hardware Trojan (HT), trustworthiness of Integrated Circuit (IC) supply chain is a burning issue in Semiconductor Industry nowadays. Over the last decade, extensive research has been carried on HT detection methods for digital circuits. However, the HT issue remains largely unexplored in the domain of Analog Mixed Signal (AMS)/ RF circuit where it is now an appealing target for the attackers. The increasing popularity of Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing (OFDM) based wireless cryptographic ICs in modern communication systems makes it a lucrative target for HT-based attacks which could have a devastating impact on data security. This paper presents a trigger-based Hardware Trojan Threat model that exploits the extended cyclic prefix (ECP) property of the OFDM communication scheme to leak the secret encryption key over low noise Additive White Gaussian Channel (AWGN) and developed a Cyclic Prefix (CP) checker based detection mechanism named “SENTRY” to detect such trojans once it is triggered.
Highlights
Integrated circuits (ICs) are a core component of all electronic devices and products that are widely used today in our daily life as well as in modern civilization like consumer products, communication, energy, defense, finance, transport, etc
This paper presents research aiming to bridge the said gap by introducing a Time-Triggered Other Payload-based Mixed Signal hardware Trojan (HT) which steals the secret key of a secure Wireless Cryptographic IC exploiting the Extended Cyclic Prefix (ECP) property of the Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing (OFDM) communication scheme
This paper proposes a cyclic prefix-based hardware trojan detection system named “SENTRY” that works as an OFDM symbol validator on the transmitter side
Summary
Integrated circuits (ICs) are a core component of all electronic devices and products that are widely used today in our daily life as well as in modern civilization like consumer products, communication, energy, defense, finance, transport, etc. To reduce manufacturing cost and time to market, various part of IC design cycle has been outsourced to different parts of the world [1,2,3]. This globalization of the IC supply chain has resulted in tremendous vulnerabilities and security concerns for mission-critical and safety-critical applications [4,5,6,7] and this is known as hardware Trojan (HT). It is found that in the past decade extensive researches from industry, academia, and Govt have been conducted on understanding the different aspects of HT [12,13,14] and its detection [15,16,17,18] and Prevention [19, 20] in digital circuits the topic remains largely unexplored and missing in the analog/RF ICs
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