An Underestimated Cybersecurity Problem: Quick-Impact Time Synchronization Attacks and a Fast-Triggered Detection Method

Abstract

For cybersecurity concerns in smart girds, this paper has focused on the vulnerability analysis and defense technique against the Time Synchronization Attack (TSA). This kind of attack can spoof satellite-signal-based time synchronization processes that are widely utilized in modern power systems. A quick-impact TSA experiment is presented in this paper, based on live satellite signals and a commercial time server used in current smart grids. Experiment results are alarming. Intolerable timing errors have been imposed on the server within a few tens of seconds, and it hasn’t reported any alarms. So a new cybersecurity concern for distributed power systems is revealed: stealthy TSAs must be detected at the early stage due to their quick impacts, yet current studies have underestimated this problem. In response to this potential threat, a fast-triggered detection method is proposed in this paper. It is named the Rapid Detection of Signal Distortions (RDSD) and can detect early stage signal distortions caused by TSAs at the beginning. Apart from this ability, we have also verified, via simulations and real-world comparative experiments, that the proposed method can provide improved detection and false alarm rejection capacity compared with existing methods of this type. Overall, this paper can raise attention to the cybersecurity problem caused by TSAs and facilitate the defense against them in modern smart grids.