An Uncertain Future for EU-Level Collective Bargaining: The New Rules of the Game After EPSU

Abstract

Abstract The General Court of the European Union (GCEU) in EPSU and Goudriaan vs. Commission and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in the subsequent appeal judgment reached an identical conclusion on a key aspect of the system of EU level collective bargaining. The Courts held that Article 155(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) does not impose any obligation on the European Commission to send a social partner agreement to the Council. This is in line with the Commission’s recent interpretation of Article 155(2) TFEU that subordinates the implementation of the European agreements to a positive assessment of their appropriateness. This article critically assesses the GCEU and CJEU rulings in EPSU and argues that they confirm a major break with the praxis of European collective bargaining that will have negative consequences for the social partners’ autonomy and role in the EU. In order to better understand this break, the article examines how and when the Commission changed its approach to European social dialogue, resulting in the new interpretation of Article 155(2) TFEU, and proposes a hypothesis to understand why. The article concludes by describing the consequences of the new reading of Article 155(2) TFEU for the idea of collective autonomy in EU law as well as for the practice of EU level social dialogue and collective bargaining.