An Ongoing Conversation

Abstract

The increasing polarization of the public's views on public education serves us poorly; we need to revive the skill and will to engage in more thoughtful dialogue, Mr. Bacchetti points out. WE DON'T look at the big issues of the principles and purposes of public schools often or carefully enough. Sadly, the political and philosophical conversation seems increasingly polarized. In Venn diagram terms, the two circles -- labeled right/left, basics/constructivist, academic/child-centered, etc. -- reveal at best a vanishingly thin region of overlap. When the true believers on either side look in the mirror, they see Dumbledore. Over their shoulders and gaining, they see Voldemort. Frederick Hess' beefy rhetoric stakes out a position that reflects a more conservative world view than my own. In essence, he argues that the purposes of public education will be better served if we narrow the number of principles that define its publicness and expand the number of ways those principles can be implemented. In that expanded universe, religious schools, vouchers, for-profit ventures, and other alternatives would be welcome. The principles advertised in Hess' title are woven through his essay, making difficult to distinguish his main point from his subsidiary concerns. Here is what I take to be the core of his definition of what makes a school public. In addition to teaching skills and content, public schools should: * prepare students to be productive members of the social order; * enable students to become aware of their responsibilities, including the principles, habits, and of citizenship; and * educate students to be respectful of constitutional strictures, including laws, process, and rights. In carrying out these functions, public school systems should also: * not deny access to students for reasons unrelated to [a school's] educational focus; and * provide an appropriate placement for each student in every community. Asserting by implication that the meanings of his key terms are inherently obvious, Hess goes on to argue that the terms others might use to set forth other principles are not. For example, he observes that diversity and tolerance are umbrella terms with multiple interpretations. Therefore, they lie outside his cluster of principles because, when we try to define them more precisely, it becomes clear that we must privilege some values at the expense of others. If he believes that a similar privileging of certain values might color his own key terms, such as obligations of citizenship, productive members of the social order, societal responsibilities, individual rights, and the like, he gives no indication. Hess seems to arrive at his position partly for affirmative reasons (e.g., an emphasis on academic learning) and partly because of a surprisingly bitter view of educators (some of whom he names, but most of whom he only characterizes). In his view, these educators * explicitly a particular world view and endorse a particular social ethos; * promote partisan attitudes toward American foreign policy, the propriety of affirmative action, or the morality of redistributive social policies; * teach students to accept teen pregnancy or homosexuality as normal and morally unobjectionable; * attempt to stamp out familial views and impress children with socially approved beliefs; and * treat public institutions as their personal playthings. To illustrate his more general points, Hess portrays the meaningful questions asked in the classrooms of the Coalition of Essential Schools as a herd of Trojan ponies surreptitiously unloading the teachers' agendas. It's not clear what meaningful questions might be in the classrooms he approves of, though readers might infer that they would be limited to the rational analysis of topics that arise from well-developed and authoritatively taught subject matter. …