An Jū-Kon to Nik-Kan kankeishi [An Chung-gŭn and the History of Japanese-Korean Relations] (review)

Abstract

BOOK REVIEWS143 An Ju-Kon to Nik-Kan kankeishi [An Chung-gún and the History of Japanese-Korean Relations]. By Ichikawa Seimei. Tokyo: Hara Shobö, 1979. 675 pp. ¥5,000. In April 1979, the chief of staff of the Japanese Land Self-Defense Forces visited South Korea, and the Korean-Japanese Parliamentary Conference on Security Affairs was established. In July, the Director-General of the Japanese Defense Agency paid his first official visit. There is no doubt that Japanese-South Korean relations entered a new epoch. Japanese companies already own 58 percent of all foreign equity in South Korea, and South Korea is heavily dependent upon Japanese trade. In spite of such close ties between Japan and South Korea, the two peoples have yet to resolve the emotional conflicts that have persisted since Japan forced the opening of the hermit kingdom in 1876. The interaction between Japan and South Korea since the two nations "normalized" their relations in 1965 has been predominantly economic in character. Intellectual and cultural exchanges have been sporadic and formal. While a great number of Japanese tourists and businessmen have visited South Korea, the contacts between the two peoples have been superficial at best. The two peoples have yet to "touch their hearts." The Koreans could very well sympathize with Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai who took strong exception to Premier Tanaka's comment in Peking that Japan had caused "inconveniences" to China in the 1930s and 1940s. Examples abound. In March 1979, the head of the Japanese Federation of Managerial Organizations (Nihon Keieisha Dantai Rengökai), Sakurada, caused a major incident at an international seminar by stating that the phenomenal growth of the South Korean economy was due to excellent education provided during the Japanese colonial period. The unanimous reaction of the Korean press was that of anger. They recalled that in March 1955 Kubota Kanichirö, the head of the Japanese delegation in the Korean-Japanese negotiations for the normalization of relations, had stated that the establishment of a former colony as an independent nation before the signing of a treaty of peace was rather unusual; that the United States should be criticized for enforcing complete repatriation of Japanese residents from Korea before a treaty of peace had been concluded; that the Japanese administration of Korea was not altogether bad, and that much was done to help the Koreans in the sense that port facilities, schools, and hospitals were built and spectacular advances were made in rice cultivation; and that the reference in the Cairo Declaration to the Korean people as being in a state of slavery was an exaggeration caused by the emotional stress of war. The Japanese government refused to rescind this so-called Kubota statement for two years in spite of the violent reaction of the Korean government. Both of these remarks have been characterized in Korea as "mangön" (bögen in Japanese) or reckless remarks. These "incidents" of recent years are worth noting because very similar types of emotional conflict and differences of opinion prevailed in 1909 when Count Ito Hirobumi was assassinated by An Chung-gün in Harbin. Ito and his 144ICHIKAWA colleagues undoubtedly believed that the Japanese policy of placing Korea under its control was justified for the sakes of both Japan and Korea. Since the early 1890s, Japan had striven without avail to encourage the Korean government to reform itself in order to put the latter on firmer political, economic, and diplomatic grounds. Only by annexing Korea could Korea be reformed and the stability of East Asia be assured. Recalcitrant Koreans, a group including that nation's emperor, should be disposed of for the good of Korea. The Korean reaction to Japanese policy, however, was quite the opposite. Many Koreans had supported Japan's war efforts against Russia between 1904 and 1905, because of the Japanese declaration that the war was to assure peace in Asia and to consolidate Korea's independence. For racial and cultural reasons, the Koreans also preferred Japan over Russia. Various remarks of An Chungg ün to his interrogators also indicate that the Koreans were resigned to Japanese "protection" of Korea in the wake of the Japanese victory against...