An Investigation of the Effect of Audit Partner’s Disclosure on Earnings Management for Egyptian Companies

Abstract

International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB), Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) and European Union (EU) have made significant efforts to restore the credibility, information, accuracy, and independence of the audit report by requiring disclosure of the audit partner's name and/or the audit partner's signature on the audit report. This research aims to study and examine the relationship between the audit partner's voluntary disclosure and earnings management. In precise, examine whether the audit partner's disclosure leads to lower level of earnings management. The research has also aimed for examining the impact of the audit partner quality on the aforementioned relationship, using a sample from the companies listed in the Egyptian Stock Exchange for the period starting from 2014 to 2018. The results indicated that: (1) there is a statistically significant negative effect for the audit partner disclosure on the absolute value of earnings management proxied by Miller Ratio; which in turn means that the audit partner disclosure increases the earnings quality. (2) There is no effect for the audit partner quality proxied by his industrial specialization on the relationship between audit partner disclosure and the earnings quality. The findings of this research have important consequences for regulators in determining whether the actual effects of a disclosure requirement are as expected, for investors in reducing costs of obtaining information, and for audit committees in making better decisions when hiring auditors.