Abstract
A social welfare function assigns a social preference ordering to each admissible profile of individual preference orderings of a set of alternatives. Arrow (1963) required a social welfare function to satisfy the following list of axioms: Weak Pareto (if everyone strictly prefers one alternative to a second alternative, then so does society), Binary Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (the social preference for a pair of alternatives depends only on the individual preferences for this pair), and Nondictatorship (nobody has his or her strict preferences always respected). Arrow’s Theorem demonstrates that these axioms are inconsistent if the domain of admissible profiles of individual preference orderings is unrestricted and if there are at least three alternatives being ranked.2
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
