An Internalist View of the Epistemic Regress Problem

Abstract

Many contemporary epistemologists have perceived a need to choose between the foundationalist view that justification derives at least in part from a class of basic beliefs and the coherentist view that it derives entirely from coherence among beliefs. The reason most frequently given for the necessity of this choice is that foundationalism and coherentism represent the only possible solutions to what is commonly known as the epistemic problem, or simply the regress Briefly stated, this problem is as follows: An empirical belief is justified only if it is supported by other justified beliefs. Justification for the latter beliefs, however, depends on still other justified beliefs, and so on, seemingly ad infinitum. Thus, how can any empirical belief possibly be justified?' Recently, several writers have noted that the problem has two principal versions and that the tasks of solving these may differ. One version deals with people's abilities to be justified in holding beliefs. Questions about the nature and extent of believers' awareness of their justification are not directly relevant to this version of the problem. A second version, by contrast, addresses people's abilities to identify their justification for beliefs, at least well enough to explain to others their grounds for beliefs and to make self-aware, deliberative judgments as to which beliefs they may justifiably hold. Accounts of justification responsive to the issues of being justified and being able to identify justification