An Internalist Conception of Rational Action

Abstract

The distinction between internalist and externalist theories is a major topic in contemporary epistemology. This paper assumes that there are extensive parallels between epistemology and the theory of action, and its central task is to articulate the same distinction in the domain of action and to determine whether an internalist position in action theory can explicate rational action. It will be argued that the distinction between internalism and externalism is not only applicable to action, but raises questions in action theory similar to the issues it generates in epistemology. Indeed, it raises problems whose resolution may be possible only by a general theory of rationality applicable both to actions and to the propositional attitudes. Section I will briefly set out a version of epistemological internalism to serve as a basis for developing a similar position in action theory. Section II will formulate an internalist conception of intentional action and explore some problems which this conception, like its epistemological counterpart, must solve. Against this background, Section III will sketch an internalist view of rational action. The concluding section will summarize the main results of the paper and bring out some remaining issues.