Abstract
AbstractIn wireless access, transmitter nodes need to make individual decisions for distributed operation and do not necessarily cooperate or bargaining with each other. We consider a single-receiver random access system of transmitters (users) with altruistic payoffs which are generalized weighted individual objectives of their throughput rewards, transmission energy costs and delay costs. We compare altruistical behaviour with selfish (Nash equilibrium), cooperative (Shapley vector) and bargaining behaviour (Nash bargaining solution). We produce criteria where altruistical behaviour is more profitable for a user than either selfish, or cooperative, or bargaining ones.KeywordsALOHANash equilibriumShapley vectoraltruistical behaviourbargaining solution
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