A game-theoretic analysis of denial of service attacks in wireless random access

Abstract

In wireless access, transmitter nodes need to make individual decisions for distributed operation and do not necessarily cooperate with each other. We consider a single-receiver random access system of non-cooperative transmitters with the individual objectives of optimizing their throughput rewards, transmission energy costs and delay costs. The non-cooperative transmitter behavior may be purely selfish or may also reflect malicious objectives of generating interference to prevent the successful transmissions of the other nodes as a form of denial of service attack. Our goal is to evaluate the interactions between selfish and malicious nodes that have the dual objectives of optimizing their individual performance measures and blocking the packet transmissions of the other selfish nodes. We assume saturated packet queues of infinite buffer capacities and consider a general multi-packet reception channel that allows packet captures in the presence of simultaneous transmissions. In this context, we formulate a non-cooperative random access game of selecting the individual probabilities of transmitting packets to a common receiver. We derive the non-cooperative transmission strategies in Nash equilibrium. The analysis provides insights for the optimal strategies to block random access of selfish nodes as well as the optimal defense mechanisms against the possible denial of service attacks of malicious nodes in wireless networks. The results are also compared with the cooperative equilibrium strategies that optimize the total system utility (separately under random access and scheduled access). A pricing scheme is presented to improve the non-cooperative operation. For distributed implementation, we formulate a repeated game of the best-response strategy updates and introduce adaptive heuristics (based on the channel feedback only) provided that the system parameters are not explicitly known at the individual transmitters.