Abstract
Abstract This chapter begins with five more or less familiar ways of distinguishing between aesthetic and moral judgments. These distinctions are far from perfect—they allow of exceptions—but they constitute a reasonable guide. Then the chapter introduces two new distinctions from an expressivist framework. The first is the fact that aesthetic reasoning, but not moral reasoning, involves a particular kind of non-valenced judgment. The second is that aesthetic judgments, but not moral judgments, are recalcitrant in the face of conflicting higher-order judgments. The chapter concludes that expressivism offers a reasonably clear basis for distinguishing between moral and aesthetic judgments.
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