Abstract
Recycling and gradient utilization (GU) of new energy vehicle (NEV) power batteries plays a significant role in promoting the sustainable development of the economy, society and environment in the context of China’s NEV power battery retirement tide. In this paper, the battery recycling subjects and GU subjects were regarded as members in an alliance, and an evolutionary game model of competition and cooperation between the two types of subjects was established. Evolution conditions and paths of the stable cooperation modes between these two were explored. Suggestions were proposed to avoid entering a state of deadlock and promote the alliance to achieve the “win-win” cooperation mode of effective resource recovery and environmental sustainability. The results revealed four types of certain situations, two types of uncertain situations, and one type of deadlock situation for the evolution of alliance cooperation. The factors of the market environment are evident in not only changing the evolution paths and steady-states of the alliance but also in breaking the evolution deadlock. However, the sensitivity of the members in the alliance to different types of parameters varies greatly. It is difficult for the government to guide the formation of an ideal steady-state of cooperation or break the deadlock of evolution by a single strategy, such as subsidies or supervision. The combination of subsidy-and-supervision or phased regulation should be adopted. Only increasing subsidies is likely to weaken the function of the market and have a counterproductive effect.
Highlights
Under the guidance of relevant management policies in China, this paper focuses on power battery recycling and gradient utilization (GU) industry and constructs a game model of competition and cooperation between new energy vehicle (NEV) enterprises and gradient utilization enterprises (GUEs)
The influence of par eter changes on breaking the deadlock when an evolutionary deadlock occurs wil discussed later. This state indicates that the lost revenue from leasing batteries of the GUEs is between the saving costs when the NEV manufacturers choose to self-build and co-construct recycling sites
According to the research report of China Merchants Securities on power battery recycling and GU, there will be 26.69 GWh NEV Lithium-Ion Batteries (LIB) in China in 2020, among which the lithium iron phosphate batteries which will be suitable for GU represent 20.15 GWh
Summary
With the intensification of global warming and the decline in petroleum resources, the promotion and diffusion of new energy vehicles (NEVs) continue to be an important way for China to coordinate efforts to cope with the pressure of energy security, ecological and environmental protection, and climate change [1,2]. The contribution of this study is to reveal four types of certain modes, two types of uncertain modes, and one type of deadlock mode for the evolution of alliance cooperation, and the evolution conditions and intervention strategies of each mode is proposed It can provide a strategic reference for China’s power battery recycling and GU alliance to form a stable “win-win” cooperation mode, and avoid falling into a deadlock of evolution. It can provide a basis for the government to guide and supervise the development of battery recycling and utilization industry in a timely and effective manner. The establishment and analysis of the replicated dynamic equations are given in Appendix A
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