Abstract
This paper develops simple models of public transfers. The sources of income inequality are differences in ability and in luck. The government employs a redistribution policy that arises from altruistic motives in the case of ability differences. I consider the case where the government re-optimizes income transfers after it observes the outcome of private activities. When the source of income inequality is differences in luck, the economy creates a mutual insurance or provides public goods out of risk-sharing motives. I derive the paradoxical result that a more able individual would not enjoy higher welfare than a less able individual. I also investigate how public transfers react to increases in income level and income inequality. JEL Classification Numbers: F21, F35.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
