An Axiomatization of the Nonsymmetric, Nontransferable Utility Value

Abstract

This chapter discusses an axiomatic solution concept for nontransferable utility value (NTU) games, that is, games in which utility is not necessarily transferable. Given a finite set of players, an NTU game is a specification of a set of payoffs that is available to each coalition of players, and a NTU game is analyzed as a fair division problem. on the chapter discusses two subclasses of NTU games: the two-person bargaining problems and the n-person games with transferable utility. There are many axiomatized solutions for the first class and prominent among these is the Nash bargaining solution (NBS). For the class of TU games, the Shapley value is the most widely studied axiomatic solution. The NBS and the Shapley value share certain abstract features and two solutions have been proposed for n-person NTU games that coincide with the NBS if n + 2 and with the value in the case of TU games. These are the NTU value and the Harsanyi solution. In each of the characterizations of these various solutions, some type of symmetry axiom is imposed.