Abstract
In mid-August 2011, U.S. export controls over foreign access to U.S. defense technology underwent a major change, with the emphasis shifting from a singular focus on a foreign individual's nationality to a largely subjective approach focused on the risk of diversion that takes into account whether a foreign person has a security clearance or otherwise has been screened for substantive contacts with prohibited countries. This article, though written immediately before the changes became legally effective, discusses the new access requirements, which at the time of publication remain largely untested by practical experience, making the questions posed timely and relevant.
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