An Atheistic Argument from the Improvability of the Universe

Abstract

Many traditional attacks on theism, at least most of those that appeal to the existence of evil, rest their case on the alleged logical incompatibility between the existence of and the existence of God as an omnipotent, omniscient, omni-benevolent deity.1 The existence of such a being, it is claimed, logically excludes the existence of evil. But since is an undeniable fact, the nonexistence of God, so it is argued, must be equally undeniable. Some of the central tenets of this from have been challenged in recent times. One of the most brilliant challenges has come from Alvin Plantinga who has attacked the on the grounds that there is no logical incompatibility between the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient, omni-benevolent deity and the existence of evil.2 If Plantinga is right, as I tend to think he is, then those who propound the argument from evil must confess that it cannot, at least not in its traditional form, succeed against theism. In what follows, I wish to offer a new version of the old from that meets-or, rather, circumvents-certain standard objections, including those of the sort raised by Plantinga. My involves the claim that God's existence is logically incompatible, not with the fact that there is evil, but rather with the fact that this universe could be improved by God.3 The plan is to show: (1) that the proposition that God exists entails that this universe is as good as any which God can bring about,4 and (2) that this universe is not as good as any which God can bring about. The may be stated as a reductio ad absurdum: