An analysis of Strategies for Adopting Blockchain Technology in Fresh Product Supply Chain Under Freshness Misreporting

Abstract

The application of blockchain technology can inhibit producers' freshness misrepresentation in fresh produce supply chains. In this paper, we consider consumers with fresh produce freshness information traceability preference. In a fresh produce supply chain with a single producer and a single seller, the seller's blockchain application decision is studied, the Stackelberg game models of the supply chain members in the two scenarios of the producer misrepresenting freshness and the seller applying blockchain are constructed, and the changes of the equilibrium solutions before and after the application of blockchain technology are analysed. The theoretical proofs and numerical simulation studies show that when the transaction cost is at a certain level, the sellers should choose to apply blockchain technology to improve their own revenue, and the level of applying blockchain technology is affected by the consumer's retrospective preference and the cost coefficient of blockchain technology.