Abstract
In the United States, auditing standards are promulgated in the private sector by the Auditing Standards Board (ASB), which is a committee of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA). In contrast to the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), ASB members are not required to sever ties with their firms (parent organizations). As a result, ASB members have an opportunity to act as agents of their parent organizations in casting their votes for proposed Statements on Auditing Standards (SASs). McEnroe (1994) found such behaviour to exist in relation to the ‘expectation gap’ SASs and suggested as an area of future research to ascertain if this type of voting behaviour would continue on subsequent SASs. Accordingly, this research investigates the votes cast by the ASB members on the post–expectation gap SASs in an effort to determine if ‘agency’ voting has continued. The results support the proposition that agency voting behaviour is still prominent on the part of the ASB, even after repeated calls for its reformulation.
Published Version
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