An Analysis of Paul Feyerabend’s Incommensurability Theory

Abstract

This article focuses on an analysis of Paul Feyerabend’s incommensurability theory. Paul Feyerabend and Thomas Kuhn are the proponents of incommensurability theory in contemporary philosophy of science, though their views on incommensurability thesis are not exactly the same. Incommensurability theory is one of the major contributions of Paul Feyerabend in philosophy of science. The fundamental questions are: What actually does Feyerabend mean by incommensurability of fundamental scientific theories? Do the meanings of scientific concepts change when scientific theories change? Do scientific theories affect the meanings of scientific concepts? How does Feyerabend’s incommensurability theory differ from that of Thomas Kuhn? Has Feyerabend’s incommensurability theory any implication for scientific development? What are the strengths and weaknesses of Feyerabend’s incommensurability theory? These and other related issues are the central focus of this article. Employing basically analytical method, this article examines Feyerabend’s incommensurability theory. This study discovers that Feyerabend’s incommensurability theory has both relationship of similarity and dissimilarity with that of Kuhn, and at the same time has implications for scientific development. It also argues that Feyerabend’s idea leads to relativism and subjectivism. The researcher concludes that though Feyerabend’s incommensurability theory has some shortcomings, Feyerabend is a force to reckon with in contemporary philosophy of science as a result of his innovations and revolutionary ideas in the discipline.