An American Economist in a Developmental State: Marion Clawson and Israeli Agricultural Policy, 1953-1955

Abstract

During 1953-1955, the American agricultural economist Marion Clawson advised the Government of Israel (GOI) as a member of the Economic Advisory Staff (EAS), a group of American economists invited by Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion. Clawson, a protege of John D. Black and Mordecai Ezekiel, was formerly Director of the US Bureau of Land Management (1948-1953). Clawson discovered that Israeli agriculture and irrigation were highly inefficient, and that planning almost completely ignored economic considerations. In 50 policy memoranda, he openly criticized Israel’s agricultural policy, and stated that Israel’s national goals—defense, full irrigation of the Negev desert, immigrant absorption via new agricultural settlements, and economic independence—were mutually contradictory. His major recommendations were: make Israel’s agricultural plan more realistic by reducing projected agricultural prices; end expensive Negev irrigation; increase irrigated farm size eightfold; freeze new settlements until the number of semi-developed settlements falls from 300 to 100; and limit new Negev settlements to 10 over 5-7 years. Minister of Finance Levi Eshkol and Minister of Agriculture Peretz Naphtali vehemently rejected Clawson’s recommendations, on the grounds that they were based on a pure economic perspective, with no consideration of Israel’s national goals. By September 1954, Clawson shifted to a more pragmatic approach: He toned down his criticism and sought common ground with the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA). Soon afterwards, he proposed to write a comprehensive report in collaboration with the MOA, which would be published as Israel Agriculture 1953/54 (IA). IA was a consensus document: It presented facts and asked questions, but did not prescribe policies. In IA, Clawson accepted that the GOI would likely prioritize noneconomic goals over economic efficiency. In proposing IA as a collaborative project, Clawson made a pragmatic decision to relinquish some independence for a chance to exert greater influence. We conclude that a. Clawson was only somewhat successful as an advisor, because his recommendations were considered seriously by the MOA but not by Eshkol (who trusted his own expertise); b. Although Clawson’s advice was highly insightful, in hindsight he was overly pessimistic regarding agricultural prices, and, most importantly, the Negev’s agricultural potential.