American Reaction to Soviet Aircraft in Cuba, 1962 and 1978

Abstract

An alarm over the Soviet transfer of MiG-23 fighter-bombers to Cuba, raised by columnists Evans and Novak in the Washington Post on 15 November 1978,1 subsided after a few weeks-although not all of the questions raised were entirely put to rest. The Carter administration was able, after monitoring closely the situation in Cuba and after consulting the Soviet leaidership, to reassure the American public that there was no evidence that a nuclear attack capability was being provided. The president also announced that the Soviet authorities had given assurances that no nuclear capability would be provided and that the 1962 understanding would continue to be adhered to. The matter soon faded as a public issue. Some who in 1978 most vigorously challenged the compatibility of the transfer of MiG-23s to Cuba with the 1962 understanding between the United States and the Soviet Union did so in order to raise doubts-both over Soviet trustworthiness and intentions, and over the strength and steadfastness of the Carter administration. In particular, some opponents of a SALT II agreement sought to use the issue to brand the Soviets as hard and the administration as soft on a security question, and thereby to discredit both. Some others wondered whether the Soviets were probing or testing the mettle of the United States. Some were merely unsure what the 1962 understanding covered-clearly strategic offensive ballistic missiles, ballistic missile submarine