Abstract
Vagueness and ambiguity are key problems in theories of legal interpretation. The article first delimits vagueness and ambiguity and sets it into relation to related phenomena like the generality of legal expressions (i). Vagueness proves to be a multifaceted phenomenon which can be systematised along three distinctions: vagueness of individuation and classification, degree and combinatory vagueness, and semantic and pragmatic vagueness. For law pragmatic vagueness seems of specific import (ii). As for the origins and accounts of vagueness the different approaches are sorted into logic, ontic, epistemic and semantic accounts with epistemic and semantic accounts showing the closest relations to legal theories of interpretation (iii). The last section argues that vagueness is not a threat to legal interpretation and rule of law values properly understood. It is cautious, though, with regard to some suggested values of vagueness. However, it sees a value of vagueness in reducing decision costs, which cannot be completely accommodated by other semantic features of vague concepts like generality (iv). Keywords : philosophy of law, legal interpretation, ambiguity, vagueness.
Highlights
Vagueness and ambiguity are key problems in theories of legal interpretation
The last section argues that vagueness is not a threat to legal interpretation and rule of law values properly understood
Though, with regard to some suggested values of vagueness. It sees a value of vagueness in reducing decision costs, which cannot be completely accommodated by other semantic features of vague concepts like generality (iv)
Summary
A vagueza e a ambiguidade são problemas-chave nas teorias da interpretação jurídica. O artigo primeiramente delimita a vagueza e a ambiguidade e coloca essa questão em relação com fenômenos similares como a generalidade das expressões jurídicas (i). Quanto às origens e explicações da vagueza, as diferentes abordagens são classificadas em explicações lógicas, ônticas, epistêmicas e semânticas, sendo que explicações epistêmicas e semânticas mostram a maior proximidade com as teorias da interpretação jurídica (iii). A última seção argumenta que a vagueza não é uma ameaça à interpretação jurídica e ao Estado de Direito propriamente compreendidos. O artigo enxerga um valor da vagueza em reduzir os custos de decisão, que não podem ser completamente contemplados por outros atributos semânticos de conceitos vagos como generalidade (iv). Palavras-chave: filosofia do direito, hermenêutica jurídica, ambiguidade, vagueza
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