Allocating Coalition Payoffs by Conventional Norm: An Assessment of the Evidence from Cabinet Coalition Situations

Abstract

A problem in the application of formal theories of coalition formation has been whether a conventional rule governs payoff allocations. Specifically, it has been suggested that certain ministerial portfolios are much more desirable than others, and so are allocated in a manner substantially different from that which might characterize the payoff distribution seen as a whole. Using data from 132 European coalition governments (1945-1978), this paper presents strong evidence that a proportionality rule governs all aspects of coalition payoffs. We consider the differences in the findings of previous research with an eye to both methodological and theoretical adequacy. In particular, the difficulties of basing inferences on comparisons of correlation coefficients are discussed. Finally, we demonstrate that such slight deviations from the rule of proportional division (a rule based on the size of party actors) as occur are also related to the size factor-i.e., smaller actors may be overpaid when their larger partners feel the coalition is secure.