Coalition behavior: Effects of earned versus unearned resources

Abstract

Previous studies of coalition games involving differences in both individual resources and coalition payoffs have found negligible effects for resources. Instead, coalition behavior in such games is primarily a function of bargaining strength (the payoffs available to players in alternative coalitions). The present study tested the possibility that the lack of resource effects in previous studies was due to resources being randomly assigned to the players, rather than being earned by them. The study also tested three theories of coalition formation: minimum resource theory, bargaining theory, and the equal excess model. It was found that the tendency for coalition members with larger resources to be offered, and actually to receive, more of the payoff than coalition members with smaller resources was stronger when resources were earned than when they were unearned. Players were also more likley to think that payoff divisions favoring the coalition member with larger resources were fairest when resources were earned rather than unearned. Bargaining strength also affected coalition behavior, however. The asymptotic predictions of bargaining theory, which are based partly on resources and partly on bargaining strength, provided the most accurate estimates of payoff divisions, although none of the theories was very accurate.