Alleviating Misery: The Politics of North Korean Human Rights in U.S. Foreign Policy

Reviewed by: North Korean Human Rights: Activists and Networks ed. by Andrew Yeo & Danielle Chubb David Hawk, Adjunct Lecturer (bio) North Korean Human Rights: Activists and Networks ( Andrew Yeo & Danielle Chubb eds., Cambridge University Press, 2018), ISBN-13: 978-1108425490, 330 pages. North Korean Human Rights: Activists and Networks1 collects twelve essays on the transnational non-governmental efforts to promote human rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea). The core chapters are descriptions of the North Korean human rights activist movements in South Korea, Japan, the United States, and Western Europe. Other chapters examine the outreach of North Korean refugees now living in South Korea (commonly called "defectors" there),2 efforts to get information about the outside world into North Korea, NGO (nongovernmental organization) efforts at the United Nations, and North Korea's efforts to respond to the accusations and advocacy directed against its human rights practices. Two of these chapters were written by NGO activists, and the other chapters were written by young scholars in the United States, Japan, Australia, and South Korea. A number of chapters attempt to utilize social science methodologies and to infuse their analyses with contemporary academic theory. Promoting human rights in North Korea is unique in today's world owing to both the DPRK's deliberate selfisolation from most normal interaction with the international community and the "closed" nature of North Korean society.3 In virtually every other country situation, transnational NGOs work in consultation with and in support of indigenous citizen activists and rights defenders. However, North Korea has no civil society and citizen surveillance is ubiquitous. Citizen associations, media, and broadcasts are under the direct control of the Korean Workers' Party and the various DPRK State organs, and there is virtually no unauthorized or unsupervised contact or communication.4 Thus, just about all human rights activists and NGOs can do is document violations (mostly from information provided [End Page 290] by refugees) and seek to inform international public opinion and influence the posture of other nation-states, particularly in a variety of UN fora. In these efforts, human rights advocates have achieved considerable success. North Korean human rights violations have become a major subject of international concern, second only to North Korea's nuclear weapons programs. "[T]he situation of human rights in the DPRK"5 is assessed and condemned annually by huge majorities at the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) and UN General Assembly, and, from 2014 through 2017, North Korean human rights violations were discussed annually by the UN Security Council. Such "successes" are, of course, penultimate, as the ultimate goal is to affect the human rights practices of the regime and improve the lives of the North Korean citizenry. Notwithstanding, this volume is packed with information about efforts to accomplish this and thus fills in a gap in the now voluminous academic and policy literature on North Korea. Several chapters stand out. Celeste Arrington, an Assistant Professor at George Washington University, provides a clear account of the complex relationship between Japan and North Korea6—the huge concern in Japan about previous North Korean abductions of Japanese citizens, a major political issue—and articulates concerns about North Korean mistreatments of North Koreans. This includes ethnic Koreans once resident in Japan who migrated to the DPRK in the 1960s (many of whom ended up in prison camps). Several hundred of these ethnic Koreans escaped to China and again returned to Japan. Sandra Fahy, a Korean-speaking anthropologist teaching at Sophia University in Tokyo, provides a fine account of North Korea's counterproductive and self-defeating responses to human rights criticism.7 In her chapter in North Korean Human Rights, Fahy analyzes the DPRK responses at the UN Commission of Inquiry (COI)-generated criticism; perhaps more importantly, she analyzes North Korean domestic media such as the Korean Central News Agency and Rodong Sinmun, the leading newspaper of the DPRK.8 North Korea's self-defense includes what Fahy terms "ersatz civil society" commentary by governmentinstigated non-governmental organizations (GINGOs)9 and so-called "man-inthe-street" interviews.10 Fahy finds North Korean responses to human rights advocacy to be self-discrediting abroad and counterproductive...

This paper examines the protection of the constitutional rights of North Korean residents, focusing on ways to improve the North Korean Human Rights Act, which has faced various difficulties in enforcement, such as the failure to establish the North Korean Human Rights Foundation since its enactment in 2016. Despite the absence of effective control by our government over the area north of the Military Demarcation Line, the North Korean Human Rights Act was introduced through a difficult legislative process to realize the fundamental rights guaranteed by our Constitution that North Korean residents should universally enjoy as human beings. The North Korean Human Rights Act, consisting of 17 articles, has characteristics such as being a unification law and a foundation for a unification constitution, a product of political compromise, a concretization of fundamental rights norms in the North Korean region, an application of our Constitution to North Korean residents, and primarily an organizational law, which distinguish it from the North Korean human rights laws of the United States and Japan. Regarding individual provisions, the purpose and basic principles of the North Korean Human Rights Act, the definition of North Korean residents, and other provisions were analyzed and critiqued in light of the interpretation of our Constitution regarding North Korea and its residents. Furthermore, the operational status of major institutions and systems, such as the Advisory Committee on North Korean Human Rights, the North Korean Human Rights Promotion Plan, and the North Korean Human Rights Foundation, was pointed out. In particular, as the launch of the North Korean Human Rights Foundation has been delayed, causing various problems, it was emphasized that bipartisan consensus and active efforts for improvement by the National Assembly and the government are necessary in light of the goal of protecting the universal fundamental rights of North Korean residents. The problems and solutions of the dual system of the North Korean Human Rights Records Center and the North Korean Human Rights Records Repository, as well as the significance and limitations of the North Korean Human Rights Report, were also examined. Additionally, the introduction of new provisions was discussed, including the addition of North Korean sanctions measures, measures to promote freedom of information, the addition of criminal justice procedures, and the possibility of adding substantive content related to fundamental rights.

In May 2002, China decided not to repatriate North Korean asylum seekers who fled to Shenyang. The decision was not only in contravention of the 1986 North Korea-China bilateral repatriation agreement, but also constituted China's repudiation of its policy denying refugee status to North Koreans in China. What explains China's change in policy in the Shenyang case? We argue that transnational advocacy networks (TANs) for North Korean human rights (NKHR) played a significant role in China's non-repatriation decision. Theoretically, the article develops a set of five propositions that specify an organizational mechanism through which TANs effectively work, and use social network analysis to test these propositions. Empirically, we employ both qualitative and quantitative methods of analysis (the combination of discourse and content analysis) in order to capture the crucial role of TANs in China's policy change. Thematically, our case study of China's non-repatriation decision reveals the growing importance and relevance of TANs in world politics. Key words: North Korea, human rights, China, social network analysis, transnational advocacy network Introduction In May 2002, China decided not to repatriate North Korean asylum seekers who had fled to Shenyang. The decision not only contravened the 1986 North Korea-China bilateral repatriation agreement; China also repudiated its policy of denying refugee status to North Koreans in China. Previously, China routinely repatriated North Koreans when they were captured within China's borders because it did not recognize their refugee rights.1 What explains the change in China's policy in the Shenyang case? We argue that transnational advocacy networks (TANs) for North Korean human rights (NKHR) played a significant role in bringing about China's policy reversal by their strategic use of human rights norms. Following the scholarship of Keck and Sikkink, we define TANs as networks involving actors working internationally on an issue, who are bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchanges of information and services.2 In referring to TANs for NKHR, we specifically mean those advocates from Western Europe, Japan, South Korea, and the United States who promote substantial changes in normative and juridical discourse and policy regarding North Korean human and refugee rights. More specifically, the human rights advocacy network includes citizen organizations and NGOs, such as Durihana Mission, Refuge Pnan, and Citizens Alliance for North Korean Human Rights, as well as individual activists such as Tim Peters from Helping Hands Korea, Pastor Douglas Shin, and German doctor Norbert Vollertsen. In analyzing the Shenyang case, we aim to contribute to the existing literature of TANs in three major ways: theoretically, methodologically, and thematically. Ever since the seminal publication of Activists Beyond Borders by Keck and Sikkink in 1998, there has been a surge of studies exploring the formation, structure, and campaign strategies and tactics of TANs.3 Yet despite all the attention paid to the role of TANs in influencing policy, we know relatively little about how TANs work to achieve their goals within and between advocacy organizations. Previous studies have tended to posit-without offering a specific organizational mechanism-the efficacy of the dense, horizontal, mediasensitive, organization-centered, and Internet communication- based networking patterns of transnational activists. Also, few studies have examined the dynamics of inter-organizational communications and activities of TANs when they try to influence policy in their target countries. Our aim is to fill these gaps theoretically and empirically. Theoretically, we develop (or reformulate) a set of five propositions that specify an organizational mechanism through which TANs effectively work. We developed these propositions from a close examination of the existing literature of TANs. …

This article examines, on the basis of international human rights norms, the controversies that exist in South Korean society with respect to North Korean human rights issues. The article looks at current human rights conditions in North Korea; the root causes of these human rights concerns; the conditions faced by the problems associated with planned defection; reactions to the 2004 North Korean Human Rights Act passed by the U.S. Congress; and the direction that should be taken to improve human rights conditions in the country. We can only expect a continuation of debate within South Korean society on these issues until a fundamental point of agreement is reached, one that can serve as a rational and practical basis for improving the human rights situation in North Korea. Key words: North Korea, human rights-East Asia, South Korea Introduction Issues regarding North Korea and its policies have always been under the spotlight in South Korean society. It should perhaps be of no surprise that such issues are being discussed ever more frequently as Korea's economy further advances and its democracy continues to mature. Since the end of the cold war, international concern over nuclear weapons development and human rights conditions in North Korea has grown steadily. Undoubtedly, South Korea's role in persuading North Korea to abandon its nuclear ambitions and improve the living conditions of North Korean citizens is paramount as South Korea works to build a solid foundation for an eventual peaceful reunification of the two Koreas. In order to succeed, the people of South Korea need to reach a fundamental agreement on the issues at hand. From this agreement, the government needs to develop and employ policies that have the support of the international community and South Korean people. Within South Korean society, many different opinions exist on the North Korean nuclear issue. Similarly, political parties, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and media outlets show little agreement on the issue of human rights in North Korea. The lack of public consensus on these issues is not the problem; rather, the problem is the hostility displayed between groups that hold opposing views, which extends to their unwillingness to listen to different opinions on the issues. Conflict and a lack of trust persist when what South Korea truly needs at this time is diversity and creativity. This article examines, based on international human rights norms, the controversies that exist in South Korean society with respect to North Korean human rights issues. The issues under examination are as follows: the current human rights situation in North Korea; the root causes of these human rights concerns; the conditions faced by displaced persons; the problems associated with planned defections; the reactions to the North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004 passed by the U.S. Congress; and the most desirable direction to take in order to improve the human rights situation in North Korea. The Current Human Rights Situation in North Korea Few would object to the observation that the quality of life in North Korea is remarkably poor when held up to the standards set by various human rights conventions and other nations. To date, North Korea has entered into four international human rights conventions: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR); the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW); and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). From the late 1990s until recently, North Korea has also submitted ICCPR, ICESCR, CRC and CEDAW reports to the corresponding committees, and followed examination procedures in the face of international calls to improve its human rights situation. North Korea has also made some efforts to improve the living conditions of its people. …

Due to extreme isolation, North Korean human rights situation was not well known to the world. The However, through the food crisis, the increasing number of refugees, the improving North‐South relations, and the increase of North Korean overseas interaction, the true picture of North Korean human rights situation is slowly being revealed. Finally in April 2003, the 59th UN Commission on Human Rights passed a resolution calling for international concern on the North Korean human rights situation. It brings the North Korean human rights issue into a more serious dimension, calling for immediate action by North Korean government. North Korea must now decide which way it will take between continued isolation or participation in the world community.Continuous famine, its dictatorship and nuclear confrontation are three main factors devastating its human rights status. While harsh U.S. economic sanctions and international pressure increases, domestic political control is tightening more and more. Combined with North Koreas never‐ending food shortage, its human rights situation is becoming worse. This could be a regime‐threatening factor, because it creates a vast number of refugees or defectors and draws more international criticism. North Koreas reaction and its genuine will to improve the nuclear crisis will determine the degree of future pressure by the international community.For the last 10 years, the world community through the UN has presented deep concern and critical awareness of North Koreas human rights problems. The 2003 Resolution at the UN Commission on Human Rights provides moral and legal justifications for criticism and intervention by the world community. In order to secure the effectiveness of this measure, the world community must go beyond criticism of the regime. The world community should provide North Korea with a long‐term framework that will set North Korea in the right direction. To achieve this goal, the world community must combine a comprehensive and positive approach, which includes economic aid and humanitarian assistance; with a critical and negative approach, which includes monitoring of human rights and pressure on violators. The UN human rights bodies, with the collaboration of international human rights NGOs, should also provide diverse methods of approach to effectuate the long‐term goals mentioned above. The U.S. human rights initiative will be the most critical source of pushing this international maneuver.

An Analysis of the ActOn October i8, 2004, President George W. Bush signed into law the North Korea Human Rights Act, thereby creating the position of special envoy for North Korean human rights, and calling for all North Korea-U.S. negotiations to be tied to the country's progress on human rights issues. In addition, the new law authorizes the president to provide funds for nonprofit groups to advance human rights in the country and requires verification that humanitarian and nonhumanitarian aid is used for nonpolitical purposes. The law also seeks to assure increased protection for North Korean refugees.The North Korean government is one of eight regimes to receive the designation of countries of particular by the U.S. State Department. This label is reserved for only the most severe violators of religious freedom.In a statement announcing the president's signing of the bill, the White House outlined the envoy's duties in accordance with the president's authority to conduct foreign relations. The White House reiterated its commitment to alleviating the su∂ering and repression of the North Korean people, stating that the act will provide new tools to address human rights by focusing e∂orts to help both those who flee the regime and those who are trapped inside the country. The president's signature on the law was declared to be testimony to the United States' concern for and commitment to the welfare of the North Korean people.The passage of the law is seen as a method to increase pressure on North Korea to improve its human-rights practices. According to the Korea Times, the law allows Washington to supply up to $20 million per year to individuals and nongovernment organizations around the world who are helping North Korean refugees in third countries. In addition, it permits North Korean defectors to the South to apply to immigrate to the United States.The Korea Times also reports that the law, which will be e∂ective during 2005- 2008, makes it harder for the international community to provide aid to the North unless Pyongyang improves human rights conditions for its poverty-stricken people. In South Korea, many are arguing that the bill will make it more di[double dagger]cult to work with the North Koreans. South Korea's ruling Uri Party expressed its doubts on the passing of the new law, saying that it could aggravate inter-Korean relations and exert a negative influence on the Korean economy.The paper also warned that the current North Korean nuclear stando∂ would be further complicated by passage of the law and that it would damage the sixway nuclear talks that have already been derailed. It was considered that the passage of the bill would compel the Northern regime to step up its o∂ensives against Washington, thereby delaying the resumption of the nuclear dialogue or even threatening continuation of the talks. Yonhap News reported in January that North Korea had asked the United States to negate the human rights act in order to revive the talks. While making the demand in an article in its party newspaper, Rodong Sinmun, the North, however, stopped short of making it a condition for its attendance at the six-party talks that also involve South Korea, China, Japan, and Russia.A Short Description of the ActH.R. 40ii, titled North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004 consists of five main sections: short title (section i), the table of contents (section 2), the plight of North Korean refuges (section 3), declarations of purposes (section 4), and definitions of terms used in the Act (section 5).Section 1. Short TitleThis Act may be cited as the 'North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004.'Section 2. Table of ContentsThe table of contents for this Act is as follows:Sec. 1. Short title.Sec. 2. Table of contents.Sec. 3. Findings.Sec. 4. Purposes.Sec. 5. Definitions.TITLE I-PROMOTING THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF NORTH KOREANSSec. …

The abductions of Japanese nationals by North Korean agents in the 1970s and 1980s figure prominently in Japanese conceptions of the North Korean human rights issue. In the past decade, global discussions about North Korean human rights have also come to include these abductions, the final report of the UN Commission of Inquiry in 2014 being a prime example. How did the abductions and North Korean human rights issues become so interconnected? I argue that these issues are mutually constitutive. Japanese state and non-state actors’ promotion of the abductions issue at home and abroad benefitted international advocacy for North Korean human rights and led to the integration of the abductions issue into the global North Korean human rights agenda. It also promoted awareness of North Korean human rights in Japan. Original interviews and content analysis of UN resolutions, Japanese media coverage, prime ministers’ speeches, and government publications empirically demonstrate the mutual constitution of local and international activists’ discursive messages. This article advances scholarship about feedback loops between local and international activism.

This essay offers a historicized overview of the consolidation of contemporary human rights as the dominant lingua franca for social justice projects today and applies it to the debate over human rights in North Korea. Highlighting what the rights framework renders legible as well as what it consigns to unintelligibility, it examines the antinomies of contemporary human rights as an ethico-political discourse that strives to reassert the dominance of the global North over the global South. Relentlessly presentist in its assignment of blame and politically harnessed to a regime-change agenda, the human rights framing of North Korea has enabled human rights advocates, typically “beneficiaries of past injustice,” to assume a moralizing, implicitly violent posture toward a “regime” commonsensically understood to be “evil.” Cordoning off North Korea's alleged crimes for discrete consideration while turning a willfully blind eye to the violence of sanctions, “humanitarian” intervention, and the withholding of humanitarian and developmental aid, the North Korean human rights project has allowed a spectrum of political actors—U.S. soft-power institutions, thinly renovated Cold War defense organizations, hawks of both neoconservative and liberal varieties, conservative evangelicals, anticommunist Koreans in South Korea and the diaspora, and North Korean defectors—to join together in common cause. This thematic issue, by contrast, enables a range of critical perspectives—from U.S.– and South Korea–based scholars, policy analysts, and social justice advocates—to attend to what has hovered outside or been marginalized within the dominant human rights framing of North Korea as a narrowly inculpatory, normative structure. This article is adapted and revised from the introduction to a two-part thematic issue of Critical Asian Studies on “Reframing North Korean Human Rights” (December 2013 and March 2014).

Although the main issue of North Korea is conducting nuclear tests, the issue of North Korean human rights has been continuously discussed in terms of the universality of human rights and the humanitarian intervention of the state. Each of the stakeholders who formulated and supported the North Korean Human Rights Act would present the key principles of establishing human rights of the North Korean people and observing the human rights of the North Korean government, while dealing with the human rights issue in the relationship between the parties as major details. In this paper, the human rights policy would be examined in terms of Constructionism and analyzed the characteristics of EU human rights policy and the EU’s North Korea human rights policy. This paper illustrates the EU’s human rights policy and analyzes the practical policies for promoting changes in human rights awareness in the international community. This study initiates how the enactment of the North Korean Human Rights Act affects the preference and identity of North Korea, in terms of the logic of Constructionism. Moreover this study demonstrates the enacted Act, the North Korea Human Rights Act, in the past year and suggests improvement proposal.

IntroductionOn October i8, 2004, President George W. Bush signed into law H.R. 40ii, the North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004. Act is intended to help promote human rights and freedom in the Democratic People's Republic of according to the Office of the Press Secretary of the White House. Controversies surrounding the Act began before it was officially enacted and continue to cloud efforts of many who are deeply concerned about human rights violations in North Korea. This paper is intended to clarify selected issues of controversy that surround key provisions of the Act that may hurt more than help the very people that the Act is intended to help. At this time, main concerns relate to human rights violations continuing inside North Korea and North Korean refugee problems in China.Human Rights Violations in North KoreaHuman rights violations in North Korea have been well documented in numerous publications. a special edition of the U.S. News & World Report, Omestad states that Today, at least 200,000 political prisoners are held in six giant camps, according to South Korean and U.S. officials, and the number may be growing as North Korea's leaders tighten their grip on a hungry and desperate population. The camps are nothing short of human black holes, into which purported enemies of the regime disappear and rarely exit. (Omestad, 2003, p. i2) Further, In the past three decades, some 400,000 North Koreans are believed to have perished in the gulag. Yet relatively little is known about the camps, which are sealed off from international scrutiny. U.S. News tracked down five former prisoners and who managed to defect to South Korea, and they describe a world of routine horror: beatings, crippling torture, hunger, slave-style labor, and executions. Fetuses are said to be aborted by salt water injected into women's wombs; if that fails, babies are strangled upon delivery. Guards practice tae kwon do on prisoners, who obediently line up to take their punches and kicks. (Omestad, 2003, p. i4) Lee, a female, who was fortunate to survive, said that guards force-fed her water by pushing the spout of a canister into her mouth. They laid a wooden plank across her abdomen-and pressed down, forcing water out through her mouth, nose, and bladder. (Omestad, 2003, p. i8)Jang relates other horror stories by former refugees from North Korea: saw stepping on infants' necks and tossing their bodies into buckets while their mothers screamed, said a North Korean defector. She also spoke of a woman being tied to a wooden post and then shot i8 times for begging to be allowed to feed her small children. I moved rocks for i8 hours every day but was given no more than 22 kernels of corn to eat, another defector testified. The other prisoners and I got a break once when someone was caught trying to escape. We were all forced to attend the execution. We had to throw stones at the escapee. Our loyalty to the regime was measured by the size of the stone we threw. (Jang, 2004, p. 40)A more official assessment on human rights violations in North Korea has been issued annually by the U.S. Department of State. A recent report concludes that North Korea's human rights record remains extremely poor, citing defectors who have reported that In some cases, notably at the height of the famine in the i990s, executions reportedly were carried out at public meetings attended by workers, students, school children, and before assembled inmates at places of detention; that government officials prohibit live births in prison. Forced abortion and the killing of newborn babies reportedly were standard prison practices; and that members of underground churches have been killed because of their religious beliefs and suspected contacts with overseas evangelical groups operating across the Chinese border. (U.S. Department of State, 2005, p. 2)Reports on human rights violations in North Korea are virtually endless and continue to be repeated by many defectors, humanitarian workers, and writers familiar with these cases. …

The introduction of the North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004 (HR 4011 or the Act) was hailed by many in the U.S. Congress as a significant and much-needed legislative effort that would substantially improve the human rights conditions of North Korea, considered to be one of the most unpredictable and undemocratic regimes in the world today. The passage of HR 4011 effectively marked a new and notable phase within U.S. foreign policy, in which the issue of human rights was directly linked to the issue of North Korean nuclear non-proliferation in a Helsinki-style framework. Relating to the Act, this paper argues from cross-cultural, security, and legal perspectives that HR 4011 may encounter specific limitations, which may hinder the Act from reaching its stated objectives of furthering “respect for and protection of fundamental human rights in North Korea” and “to promote a more durable humanitarian solution to the plight of North Korean refugees.” Although improving human rights is a fundamentally important issue, linking human rights with DPRK nuclear non-proliferation through HR 4011’s explicit Helsinki-style approach may exacerbate rather than eradicate North Korean human rights violations as well as the DPRK’s ongoing nuclear standoff with the international community.

Our main objective is that North Korea and South Korea become politically and economically a united country. Even before the unification occurs, both North Korea and South Korea must reconcile their difference and work to live with each other. 109 years ago, the city people called the second Jerusalem, Pyongyang, experienced a huge revival and therefore the need to restore peace in this place is vital for saving the souls and proclaiming the return of our Lord Jesus Christ. Additionally, Christian Mission seeks a transformation in a person’s life. Therefore, understanding and analysing the key reasons to the North Korean way of thinking and lifestyle is undeniably a must when looking at the Christian Mission perspective. In order to accomplish a nation-wide reconciliation and unification between North and South Korea, a proposal of unification based on the study of North Korean human rights and problem concerning defectors must be overseen. When the Korean Church can approach this matter in truthful and righteous manner, it can act as a very important mediator. The Understanding of peace and strategy by Unification Mission policy is developed by the strategic policies of North Korea Mission concerning the problems and the realities in North Korean human rights and the search for an improvement, North Korean breakaways, illegal trafficking of defector women and orphans, yoduk prison camp, dualism in North and South Korean relations, etc. The problems of North Korean mission concerning the identity of christianity can be seen by the change in lens of diverse missions . The the globalized world is perceived in the lens of capital logic. Poorer countries and its people are becoming evermore poorer and the difference between the financial traits of North Korea and South Korea has caused a problem. In this aspect, christians must seek to help North Korea mission. It is not only a commandment from Jesus Christ, but also an important part of both nations’ survival and freedom which should also be a task for every christians. Therefore, the Korean Church must strive and work for the unification of Korea as a mediator. Only then, can the church truly be a hope to the people of Korea and the values of North Korean mission policies must be created in every christians.

This chapter discusses how the North Korean defector problem began to come under the international spotlight as the result of several deliberate defection attempts that were often, since the first years of the twenty-first century, facilitated by international nongovernment organizations (NGOs). With the passage of the North Korean Human Rights Act, signed by US President George W. Bush in 2004, the adoption of North Korean human rights-related resolutions by the United Nations every year since 2005, and various accusations by NGOs over human rights violations in North Korea, the country’s human rights record has drawn significant international attention. Conversely, there have been certain observations suggesting that North Korean human rights issues, including the defector problem, might instigate a regime change in North Korea. Thus, arguments have arisen over whether or not human rights issues in the North should be related to political and security agendas.

Since 1998, the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), a quasi-private, grant-making organization funded almost entirely by the U.S. Congress via the U.S. State Department, has been, directly or indirectly through its four core institutes, supporting right-wing, neoconservative South Korean human rights and defector groups. In addition to technical assistance, this support has included $6.7 to $11.9 million from 1999 to 2010, with an additional $3 million starting January 2009 directly disbursed to many of these groups by the State Department under then newly elected Barack Obama. This article contends that NED's “human rights” work is part of a much larger strategy of destabilizing the North Korean government in line with U.S. interventionist aims against its foes. By funding international conferences and defector critiques of North Korea (including strategic testimony provided before Congress in the push for passage of the North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004), NED has fostered a North Korean human rights knowledge economy that has substantially shaped public images and opinion about North Korea in South Korea, the United States, and around the world. At the same time, NED's radio broadcasting, propaganda leaflet drops, and other incursionary media have sought to sow discord in North Korea.

The Freedom ActOn November 20, 2003, Senators Evan Bayh and Sam Brownback introduced Senate Bill S.i903-the North Korean Freedom Act. One day later Representative Jim Leach (R-Iowa), Congressman Eni Faleomavaega (D-American Samoa) and Congressman Chris Smith (R-NJ) cosponsored virtually an identical Bill, H.R. 3573. The two bills differ only in that in the House version Line 8 on Page 7 addresses the responsibility of the United States to ...accept a number of refugees for domestic resettlement. The word limited was then changed to credible. The House bill also gives North Koreans who have suffered at the hands of the North Korean government P2 status which would give them access to U.S. refugee processing without United Nations Human Rights Commission referral. The Bill increases the discretion of the Secretary of Home Security to temporarily parole North Koreans into the U.S. and it also incorporates the Hyde Bill-H.R. 367 that allows North Koreans to be treated as North Koreans and collectively as citizens of the Republic of Korea (South Korea).The Freedom Act is basically divided into five sections with the actual text beginning with Section 3. This Section states that Congress has made the following Findings. Not withstanding the fact that North Korea if not the most secretive and nontransparent entity in the world, it is probably at the top of the list. The outside world has virtually no contact with the inner workings of North Korea yet Congress finds that the economic base of North Korea is less than one half that of South Korea, that the health of the North Korean people is significantly worse than that of South Korea, that the life expectancy of North Korean babies is less than that of South Korean babies, that ten percent of North Korean children suffer from acute malnutrition, that the differences in economic performance and health of North Koreans as compared with South Koreans cannot be attributed to differences in land area or natural resources, and that the people of the Korean peninsula, are ...unjustly divided into two different countries one of which offers its citizens freedom while the other threatens them with imprisonment. starvation and death.The Findings are that North Koreans are forbidden free speech, that the citizens are imprisoned in a series of prison and labor camps, that the economy and food production are mismanaged, that the national food system has been dismantled, and that the government is ...forbidding nearly all contact with the outside world.They go on to note that there are between i00,000 and 300,000 North Korean refugees in China, that as many as 3,500,000 North Koreans have died from hunger in the past ten years, and that there are fewer than 3,000 North Korea refugees in South Korea. It does not give importance to the fact that in recent years the number of immigrants from the whole of Korea into the Unites States was to 3,500 persons. The Freedom Act does, however, propose that this limitation be lifted. The last clause of the Findings proposes that a credible number of refugees be admitted into the U.S. for domestic resettlement.This is a considerable indictment of not only United States policy but also the policies of South Korea, China, and virtually the whole of the rest of the world. One would be extremely naive to believe that there is not a problem with North Korea, but with these Findings the immediate question is-where is the documentation? If, as the Freedom Act indicates, the outside world is barred form North Korea, where does this data come from and under what circumstances?North Korea, as of 2005, has a projected population of 22,9i2,i77 persons. If there are i00,000 to 300,000 North Koreans in China (the estimate in the Freedom Act), then approximately .004 percent to .0i percent of the population has gone to China. As the Freedom Act suggests it is possible that more North Koreans would go into China except for the threat of government reprisal. …