Alignment Patterns and Crisis Bargaining: A Model of Entrapment and Abandonment

Abstract

Why are some interstate alignments closer than others? Under what conditions does the Defender support or abandon the Protege? This article examines the variation of alignment patterns and how the Defender chooses to support or abandon the Protege in different patterns. I develop a tripartite crisis-bargaining model which starts from the challenge of the Protege against the Adversary with which the Defender has the mixed relationship. Bilateral relations (the Defender vs. the Protege; the Defender vs. the Adversary) and their concerns of international reputation shape the three patterns of alignment, which affect how states behave in the crisis bargaining. The Defender constantly abandons the Protege’s challenge of the status quo in Pattern One while always supporting the Protege in Pattern Three. The second pattern highlights the Defender’s semi-separating strategy. In particular, the Defender abandons the Protege when the latter stands firm without a sufficiently high expected utility from war, as the Defender does not have enough incentives to be involved in a war against the Adversary. The abandonment of the Defender, however, delivers the Adversary a credible signal about the Protege’s strong resolution and makes the Adversary more likely to concede. Using the cross-Taiwan Strait crisis and the North Korea nuclear crisis, I illustrate how the interactions among states are consistent with the predictions of my model.