Alcohol policy, multi-level governance and corporate political strategy: The campaign for Scotland's minimum unit pricing in Edinburgh, London and Brussels.

Benjamin Hawkins,Jim Mccambridge

doi:10.1177/1369148120959040

Abstract

The Scottish government’s plans for a minimum unit price for alcohol were vehemently opposed by the alcohol industry leading to a 6-year delay in implementation after legislation was passed. This article seeks to explain the consequences of devolution and European Union membership for the development of minimum unit price in Scotland through the concepts of multi-level governance, veto points and venue shifting. Systems of multi-level governance create policy interdependencies between settings, an increased number of veto points at which policies can be blocked, and the potential for policy actors to shift decision-making to forums where favourable outcomes are more likely to be attained. In the minimum unit price debates, the alcohol industry engaged in multiple forms of venue shifting and used regulatory compliance procedures and legal challenges at the EU level to try to prevent and delay the policy. This has led to a ‘chilling effect’ on subsequent alcohol policy developments across the United Kingdom.

Highlights

Scotland experiences significant alcohol-related health inequalities internally and in comparison with the rest of the United Kingdom and Europe (Fox, 2013; Leon and McCambridge, 2006; McCartney et al, 2011)
The dynamics of policy making in the United Kingdom have been greatly affected by European Union (EU) membership and, since 1999, the devolution of power to sub-state parliaments and governments such as those in Edinburgh
Previous studies on the Europeanization of (Bache and Jordan, 2006), and the post-devolution consequences for, the British state (Cairney, 2011) identify how in many areas UK policy-making occurs within a complex system of multi-level governance, which varies in composition, effects and outcomes across policy issues and decision-making forums

Summary

Introduction

Scotland experiences significant alcohol-related health inequalities internally and in comparison with the rest of the United Kingdom and Europe (Fox, 2013; Leon and McCambridge, 2006; McCartney et al, 2011). In March 2012, MUP was adopted in the UK government’s alcohol strategy for England (HM Government, 2012) to the great surprise of many policy makers and advocates (Hawkins and McCambridge, 2020a) It was announced in July 2013 that the government would not bring forward measures to implement the policy, citing the need for more evidence of its effects, a decision that was strongly criticised by public health actors (Godlee, 2014). The constitutional-structural factors identified above placed potential limitations on the ability of the Scottish government to act given the need for compliance with both the distribution of powers between Edinburgh and London and with EU single market and competition laws This created the need for policy advocates to lobby in favour of the policy and gain political buy-in from actors in Edinburgh, Westminster and Brussels. It underlines the strategic challenges facing multi-level and trans-national non-governmental organization (NGO) networks in supporting government and countering industry opposition to achieve important policy changes

Methods

Discussion and conclusion