AGRICULTURE AND NATIONAL DEFENCE.

Abstract

Summary.When we consider the organisation of agriculture for national defence we are considering primarily ways and means of securing a food supply, and the profitableness of agriculture is considered only as contributing to the security and the economy of the supply.Food supplies must be secured, but without any unnecessary encroachment on supplies of man‐power for fighting or of man‐power or materials for implements and munitions of war. In securing food supplies we shall use external purchasing power and shipping not required for other purposes in order to save man‐power, and in order to make the best use of all resources.The comprehensive general strategy of food supplies will then include‐ Storage of foods for the first shock and for any subsequent period of pressure, with storage of some agricultural raw materials. Previous arrangement of supply of substitute labour and of supply of horses and equipment for extended arable production. Purchase of external supplies of foods as long as shipping and purchasing power is available, and so long as such purchase does not reduce necessary external supplies of other goods. Immediate mobilisation of agriculture for defence purposes‐(1) Reduction of some classes of livestock, probably beef cattle, fattening pigs and some lowland sheep, with specialised flocks of poultry, consistent with the best possible utilisation of the slaughtered stock; (2) Directing the greatest possible amount of existing and prospective crops of grain and other things to direct human consumption; (3) Sowing food crops to the limits on the available arable land; (4) Breaking pastures and preparing for sowing, and sowing (all of course at the appropriate seasons or at the most appropriate season according to the circumstances) to the limits of anticipated supplies of work‐power, equipment, and seeds. The problem of the correct use of agricultural resources in land, men and livestock for purposes of national defence can never be usefully considered except with reference to some anticipations as to the character and the possible duration of the “next war,” or except with reference to a general economic and industrial strategy. In any case the problem is not a simple one: it requires that all sorts of experience and specialised knowledge be brought to bear on its solution. It is not a problem which can be usefully approached with any casuistry: rather it calls for the greatest possible clarity and integrity of mind in those who may discuss it for the guidance of the nation. The most that one individual can do is to bring to bear on it his own general knowledge and experience and exercise his own critical abilities with the least possible prejudice.