Agonistic Justice: Difference and Persuasion in Political Theory

Abstract

This paper is intended to engage the question of persuasion in a new way. Rather than isolating persuasion and examining its normative aspects independently, this paper situates persuasion alongside an understanding of difference. By understanding difference and persuasion together, the way we think of persuasion can be importantly transformed. If the conclusions of this paper are taken seriously, we will see that persuasion needs to be managed, rather than eliminated, yet not because of any external moral standard. Rather, the management of persuasion now follows from the necessity of persuasion as a supplement to impartial rationality. Normative questions about persuasion can now be understood as inextricably linked to the question of whether a theory understands and recognizes its own limitations; recognizes the difference within itself that precludes any chance of grounding questions in absolute answers. By recognizing that persuasion is a necessary structural feature of any rational theory, more meaningful conclusions about persuasion itself can be drawn.