Abstract
Abstract Logical Empiricism, i.e. its noncognitivism, does not destroy practical rationality because it is compatible with a rational decision on normative questions by way of consequentialist reasoning according to decision theory. It is argued that the contention that Logical Empiricism destroys practical rationality is based on a confusion of a rational decision on normative questions with the interpretation of the meaning of the answers to these questions. It is further argued that a rational decision on normative questions is only possible as far as the normative status of actions is concerned. It is not possible as far as the evaluative premises about basic values are concerned. Finally it is said that a rational decision on normative questions is principally deductive. Good-reason’ s-approach and practical syllogism are therefore only enthymematic and transformable into logical deduction. Of course, proving basic values or moral principles by way of logical deduction is both as impossible as needless.
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