Abstract

AbstractWorking within standard classical higher-order logic, we propose a possible worlds semantics (PWS) which combines the simplicity of the familiar Montague semantics (MS), in which propositions are sets of worlds, with the fine-grainedness of the older but less well-known tractarian semantics (TS) of Wittgenstein and C.I. Lewis, wherein worlds are maximal consistent sets of propositions. The proposed agnostic PWS makes neither montagovian nor tractarian ontological commitments, but is consistent with (and easily extensible to) either alternative (among many others). It is technically straightforward and, we believe, capable of everything linguists need PWS to do, such as interfacing with a logical grammar and serving as a basis for dynamic semantics.Keywordspropositionspossible worldsmaximal consistent setsMontague semanticstractarian semantics

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