Must god do his best?

Abstract

If there is to be a problem of evil, there must be some ethical requirement which is applicable to divine action, and which arguably is not met in the actual world. Once such a requirement has been identified, it becomes the task of the theodicist to argue either that the proposed requirement does not hold, or that the requirement is in fact met. One of the most popular candidates for this role has been the requirement that God must create the best possible world. This proposal has undeniable appeal: it has a simplicity and "cleanness" which seems appropriate to the subject-matter, and it lays a burden on the theodicist which, at least since Candide, few have been eager to assume. But the proposed requirement has been criticized on the grounds of incoherence: it seems plausible that, if God is omnipotent, then for each world that he could create, no matter how good it may be, there is another, still better world that God could create. Thus the phrase, "best possible world," necessarily lacks a referent. David Basinger has recently pointed out, however, that there are other possible requirements on God's creative activity which are not threatened by this kind of incoherence. For instance, consider the following three sets of possible worlds: the set of worlds containing selfdetermining beings and more moral good than evil, the set of worlds containing selfdetermining beings and less moral good than evil, and the set of worlds containing no self determining beings. It might be held that God is required to create, if possible, a world which is a member of the first set. It might also be held that, if unable (perhaps due to the free choices of selfdetermining beings) to create a world of the first set, then God is ethically required to create some world of the third set in preference to any world of the second set. These requirements do not identify any one world as the best, or optimal world for God to create; thus they are not threatened by the incoherence which undermines the "best possible world" requirement.1 Of course the mere lack of incoherence does not constitute an ethical requirement as a good candidate for generating a problem of evil. Several qualities are needed in such a candidate: it must impose on God a requirement which is not International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 16:213-223 (1984). © 1984 Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht. Printed in the Netherlands.