Abstract
370 SEER, 84, 2, 2006 in March I945, Pomerania was effectively split in two. The public health situation can best be described as catastrophic, something that cannot be said of neighbouring Czechoslovakia. The basic goal of the authoritieswas to Polonize the region througha combinationof removingthe German population and forcibly assimilatingthose few who would stay on the one hand and resettlingthe depopulated areas with Poles on the other. Between I945 and I950, the overwhelming majority of Germans were expelled. Initially, some people in specializedfieldswere deliberatelyused as forcedlabourersin the reconstructionprocess and later forciblyrelocated to Germany. Between 450,000 and 500,000 Germans had been expelled by September 1948.Those who remainedwere ultimatelyaccordedofficialprotectionswhich, in practice, were rarelyenforced. Overall, this volume representssolid researchby both Polish and German historians.The documentsillustratevividlythe complexityof the transferprocess along with the associatedsuffering.The detailedindices are helpfulto the reader, but abbreviationsof organizationsthroughout the text are somewhat difficult to follow. Nevertheless, this collection of documents will serve as a great resourceto present and futurehistorians. Facuy ofSocialSciences FRANcIs D. RASKA Charles University, Prague Mevius, Martin.Agents ofMoscow:TheHungarian Communist PartyandtheOrgins of Socialist Patriotism I94I-I953. Oxford Historical Monographs. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005. xv + 295 pp. Illustrations. Notes. Bibliography. Index. ?550.o: $99.00. Given the unpopularityof Communism in Hungary as witnessed by the collapse of the Republic of Councils under Bela Kun in August I9I9 how was the Hungarian Communist Party (MKP) under Maty'asRakosi able to surviveafterWorld War Two? Did it rely completely on Soviet militarysupport ? In Agents ofMoscowMartin Mevius (Editor,Ministryof Foreign Affairs, Netherlands) answers these questions, citing primary party and government documents to show how Hungarian Communists deliberatelyconstructed a nationalistpolicy in order to achieve political supremacy.As Mevius argues, this nationalistpolicy consistedof two main parts.The MKP stroveto portray itselfas both the 'heirto nationaltraditions'and 'defenderof nationalinterests' (P. 134). Its membersretainedstreetnames and kept intactcertainmonuments built before World War Two that honoured nationalistheroes like Kossuth, Petofi, Szechenyi and Rakoczi. Hungarian Communist leaders (e.g. Rakosi, Revai) also appropriatednational holidays such as I5 March and 6 October (p. I9I). In addition,they constructedwhat Meviustermsa 'cultof martyrs' a conscious attempt to glorifysuch 'heroesof the class struggle'as the victims of 'white terror'in I919 and the Horthy regime, the Hungarian casualtiesin the Spanish civil war, and the Communist dead of WorldWarTwo (p. I92). The MKP exploited specific issues to prove to the Hungarian people that it was guarding national interests: the expulsion of the German minority REVIEWS 371 (Swabians)from Hungary, repatriationof Hungarian prisoners of war, and show trialsagainstsuch 'Trotskyitetraitors'as CardinalJozsefMindszentyand L'aszloRajk. The MKP used the question of the Swabians in several ways. First,by dint of being German,the Swabianswere painted as Hitler'serstwhile supporters, Volksbund members, and traitors to Hungary. Pressing for their expulsion showed the MKP as Hungary's defender. Secondly, in allowing the National Peasant Party to lead the anti-Swabian campaign and win support from the peasantry, the MKP was also slowly eliminating its main political rival, the SmallholderParty(pp. iI6, 136).Thirdly, R'akosiurged the Central Committee to exploit the Swabian expulsionsby linkingthem explicitly to land reform, thus - Mevius argues adding an element of ethnic conflict.The total amount of land finallyappropriatedfrom the Swabianswas 'about an eighth of the total 3.2 million hold of land distributedamong the Hungarian peasantry' (p.II7). The MKP was also able to bolster its national image by promising the return of Hungarian prisonersof war, and carryingout the promise. Understandably ,both Rakosiand Stalininitiallyfearedthat the releaseof Hungarian POWs, many of whom were formerright-wingArrow Crossmembers,would strengthen the right-wing parties in Hungary (p. I26). However, according to Mevius, Rakosi decided that the 'propagandavalue' of release of prisoners of war, and Moscow's willingness to expedite their release, outweighed the negatives. Hungarian officers would be releasedjust before the Hungarian elections, 'providing they had not served in the SS, SA, or committed war crimes against Soviet citizens' (p. I27). War crimestrialsand show trialsagainstthe Smallholderswere other useful devices the MKP used between 1945 and 1947 to show itself as the guardian of Hungarian national interests.After 1947 two key Stalinisttrialswere held, 'exposing' the allegedly anti-Hungarian, Trotskyite activities of Cardinal Mindszenty and Rajk (p. 237). Ironically,Meviuspoints out, the MKP could...
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