Abstract
AbstractA normative reason for a person to φ is a consideration which favours φing. A motivating reason is a reason for which or on the basis of which a person φs. This paper explores a connection between normative and motivating reasons. More specifically, it explores the idea that there are second‐order normative reasons (not) to φ for or on the basis of certain first‐order normative reasons. In this paper, I challenge the view that there are second‐order reasons so understood. I then show that prominent views in contemporary epistemology are committed to the existence of second‐order reasons, specifically, views about the epistemic norms governing practical reasoning and about the role of higher‐order evidence. If there are no second‐order reasons, those views are mistaken.
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