Against `Distributed Cognition'

Abstract

Since its origination in psychology, cognitive theory has been articulated in a number of social science disciplines, most notably anthropology and sociology, It has also been important in shaping the intellectual landscape of emerging disciplines associated with the design of computer systems, human-computer interaction (HCI) and computer supported cooperative work (CSCW). Some people within these disciplines, however, have accepted the criticism of cognitive theory that its emphasis upon the existence and primacy of an interior world does not appreciate the public, cultural and situated grounding of human action. In the theory of 'distributed cognition' they believe, however, that they have found reconciliation between cognitive theory and their understanding of the cultural and social grounds of human action. It is argued here that the hopes for reconciliation are, however, misplaced. There are two main reasons for this. First, is, simply, cognitive theory. Distributed cognition is an attempt to describe the cultural world in the terms of cognitive theory, not an attempt to describe it in its own tennis. Thus it is shown that the criticisms of cognitive theory, that it is founded in a conceptually inappropriate distinction between an interior and a public world, are criticisms of distributed cognition. Second, distributed cognition does not actually explain anything about the social world. It is quite possible to subtract the statements about cognitive systems from descriptions of the social world without altering those descriptions one jot. It is thus concluded that distributed cognition is not a cultural overhaul of cognitive theory but an erroneous attempt to describe the cultural and social world in the terms of an illegitimate cognitive theory.