Abstract

When groups face difficult problems, the voices of experts may be lost in the noise of others’ contributions. We present results from a “naturally noisy” setting, a large first-year undergraduate class, in which the expert’s voice was “lost” to such a degree that bringing forward even more inferior information was optimal. A single individual had little chance to improve the outcome and coordinating with the whole group was impossible. In this setting, we examined the change in behavior before and after people could talk to their neighbors. We found that the number of people who reduced noise by holding back their information strongly and significantly increased.

Highlights

  • People have varying degrees of expertise and views of the facts

  • If people of similar ability are more likely to sit next to each other, having a neighbor who abstained in the last round is associated with a higher probability to switch to abstention in the second round—even without communication

  • Our paper relates to three strands of the literature: (i) optimal extraction of information in groups, (ii) choice of equilibrium when there is communication, and (iii) learning in experiments

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Summary

Introduction

People have varying degrees of expertise and views of the facts. they often need to come to a decision without the help of some leader who imposes her view. If people of similar ability are more likely to sit next to each other, having a neighbor who abstained in the last round is associated with a higher probability to switch to abstention in the second round—even without communication. We cannot exclude this explanation because participants were not seated randomly but (as is typical for lectures) chose their seats themselves.. Examine whether these alternative explanations are consistent with the data Both alternative explanations, local but independent learning and learning to trust in the success of coordination, imply that having more abstaining neighbors in the first round is associated with a stronger increase in abstentions in the second round.

Contribution to the Literature
Model and Analysis
Experimental Design
Results
Prerequisites
Changes in Voting Behavior
Explanations for the Switch to Abstention
Result
Reasons for the Difference between the Days
Conclusions
Full Text
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