Addressing “beyond control”: nuclear safety goals in the age of risk governance

Abstract

Much of the risk science literature, in an increasingly complex world, suggests a transition from conventional risk management to risk governance. Risk governance, which highlights the multiplicity of actors and interactions among them, requires a new holistic, inclusive, and adaptive approach to managing systemic risks that cannot be addressed by traditional risk assessment and management schemes. Although nuclear risks have long been characterized as typical examples of systemic risks, the established framework of nuclear risk management has not necessarily been oriented toward risk governance. This study aims to analyze the features and challenges of the nuclear safety principles and safety goals from the risk governance perspective. The analysis shows that while the structure of existing safety goals focuses on reactor safety and quantifiable factors under the licensee’s control, it is silent on the factors that are difficult to quantify and beyond the licensee’s control. The structure of the responsibility and management framework for nuclear safety has systematically oriented the practice of risk assessment and management toward a circumscribed and compartmentalized approach. To overcome these challenges, this study presents a new conceptual framework for hybrid safety goals, reflecting the perspectives of risk governance and disaster studies. The hybrid safety goals consist of the goals for ‘artefacts’ to address reactor safety, and the goals for ‘area’ to reduce local vulnerability. The goals for ‘artefacts’ prioritize preciseness, quantitativeness, and practicality, whereas the goals for ‘area’ emphasize inclusivity and adaptability, which play a catalytic role in the collaborations between nuclear practitioners and local actors. The significance and future challenges of hybrid safety goals are discussed, particularly in terms of control and responsibility.