Active Defense Strategy Selection Method Based on Two-Way Signaling Game

Xiaohu Liu,Lulu Shao,Hengwei Zhang,Yuchen Zhang,Jihong Han

doi:10.1155/2019/1362964

Abstract

Most network security research studies based on signaling games assume that either the attacker or the defender is the sender of the signal and the other party is the receiver of the signal. The attack and defense process is commonly modeled and analyzed from the perspective of one-way signal transmission. Aiming at the reality of two-way signal transmission in network attack and defense confrontation, we propose a method of active defense strategy selection based on a two-way signaling game. In this paper, a two-way signaling game model is constructed to analyze the network attack and defense processes. Based on the solution of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, a defense strategy selection algorithm is presented. The feasibility and effectiveness of the method are verified using examples from real-world applications. In addition, the mechanism of the deception signal is analyzed, and conclusions for guiding the selection of active defense strategies are provided.

Highlights

Network information technology is developing rapidly, and interconnected systems are on the rise [1]
Defense technologies represented by rewalls, intrusion detection, and antivirus software provide passive response defense based on a priori knowledge and attack characteristics, but they cannot respond to new types of complex network attacks in an e ective and timely manner [3]
Active defense is a topic at the forefront of research in the field of network security

Summary

Introduction

Network information technology is developing rapidly, and interconnected systems are on the rise [1]. Since neither the offense player nor the defense player can fully understand the opponent’s information, influenced by the dynamic and persistent nature of the confrontation process, the dynamic game with incomplete information is more in line with the actual network attack and defense. Rough a two-way signal transmission mechanism, the method proposed in this paper can more accurately characterize the offensive and defensive strategy confrontation process This method more closely models an actual network attack and defense process. It serves as a better theoretical reference, providing practical guidance in the selection of active defense strategies under dynamic conditions of incomplete information

Analysis of Attack and Defense Game Process

Two-Way Signaling Game Equilibrium Solution and Defense Strategy Selection

Single-Stage Game Equilibrium Solution

Real Case Application and Results Analysis

Equilibrium Solution and Strategy Selection

Conclusion