Defense Strategy Selection Method for Stackelberg Security Game Based on Incomplete Information

Abstract

Network attack and defense confrontation is essentially a game process between unequal subjects on both sides of attack and defense. There are some defects in the prior hypothesis that the subject status of both sides of the attack and defense game is equal and the active defense ability is insufficient in the research of the existing network defense strategy. In this paper, game theory unequal thought and defender active release incentive technology into network defense strategy generation model construction process, and a Stackelberg Security Game defense strategy generation method based on incomplete information is proposed. By establishing the network model, the strong equilibrium strategy algorithm of Stackelberg Security Game with incomplete information is used to generate the optimal defense strategy of the network. The defender can actively release the incentive strategy without reducing the accuracy of defense strategy generation. The experimental results provide a method for the selection of optimal defense strategy, and can strengthen the security of the system.