Action and Forgetting

Abstract

Bergson's theory of memory has been and still is object of diverse interpretations that are often contradictory and unjustly dismissive, when it is not simply ignored. This paper attempts to restore coherence and soundness of theory by tying memory to theme of freedom. The connection is actually quite direct in that Bergson tackles problem of memory immediately after publishing his first book, Time and Free Will, in which he shows how duration breeds free will. To be sure, he was then aware that freedom is given in a world governed by determinism and so could not but promptly face question of knowing how two equally undeniable facts could be reconciled or how freedom could pass through meshes of natural necessity.1 This paper shows that theme of action surmounting necessity is royal road to understanding both nature and mode of operation of memory. This approach finds its premises in Bergson's theory of perception, as elaborated in first chapter of Matter and Memory.To highlight originality and strength of Bergson, paper confronts his theory of memory with that of phenomenology with view of showing that memory cannot be reduced to psychological act of intentionality. However, without denying importance of Gilles Deleuze's ontologization of memory and its effectiveness in countering Jean Hyppolite's blurring of Bergsonian distinction between past and present, paper questions fidelity of interpretation, especially ontological cut that Deleuze inserts between past and consciousness. The suggestion is that exact nature of past should be approached from functionality of forgetting and subsequent distinction between a perpetual, ontological present and a passing or psychological present. Lastly, misunderstanding around Bergsonian notion of memory-image is clarified through a confrontation with Sartre's interpretation and a reappraisal of Bergson's analysis of motor memory.The Functionality of ForgettingBergson's commentators often underline act by which memory, contracting homogeneous vibrations of matter, gives perception its qualitative features. That qualitative aspects of our perception derive from memory does not mean that matter itself is devoid of qualitative features, but that memory accentuates by contraction heterogeneity of perceived qualities, which exist in a diluted form in matter. The retentional attribute of memory enables holding of various and successive moments of matter in one single moment of consciousness, result of which is that not only qualitative heterogeneity of matter is intensified, but also discontinuous and successive vibrations of matter are immobilized or solidified. This immobilization of movements is how they are made into objects of action. The contracting power of memory thus realizes condition of free action, namely, disengagement of living beings from extremely rapid rhythm of matter. As Bergson writes, the independence of their action upon surrounding matter becomes more and more assured in degree that they free themselves from particular rhythm which governs flow of this matter.2What is less emphasized by commentators is that very nature of perception, as understood by Bergson, is key to his theory of memory. Indeed, going against prevailing belief equating perception to a preliminary form of knowledge, Bergson squarely defines perception as action, more exactly as possible action.3 Moreover, he shows that consciousness itself emerges from delayed actions induced by ability of brain to retard responses of living body to actions of environment. The brain generates indeterminacy within interactions of material objects, thereby actualizing conscious act of objects presented as possible actions.Possible actions signify insertion of choice in determinism of matter, which choice presupposes recollecting faculty of memory, for the indetermination of acts to be accomplished requires . …