Difference and Creativity

Abstract

The concept of virtual holds central position in philosophy of Gilles Deleuze. Brian Massumi states that it probably most pivotal . . . concept in Deleuze and Guattari's philosophical vocabulary (Massumi, 34). Daniel W. Smith writes, entire philosophy is concerned with description of this virtual domain (Smith, 172). The concept of virtual can be found in several of Deleuze's writings on history of philosophy. There is oscillation between virtual and actual that he sees in Leibniz (DR, 212-13 and LB, 104-05), and related concept ofpotentia that he finds in work of Spinoza (SPP, 97-104; Massumi 156n53).1 But Deleuze adopts this contrast between virtual and possible most directly from work of Henri Bergson.2 This essay will analyze Deleuze's reading of virtual/actual distinction in Bergson's work and how aspects of this distinction can be found in Deleuze's own concept of a life. The importance of virtual has been noted by number of commentators. Alain Badiou concentrates on ontological character of virtual in his The Clamor of Being but does not discuss Bergsonian inspiration for this concept (Badiou, 43-53). In his Vocabulaire de Deleuze, Francois Zourabichvili discusses transcendental dimension of virtual without explaining process of actualization or its origin in Bergson's work (Zourabichvili, 89-91). Constantin V. Boundas more thoroughly addresses virtuality-possibility distinction and how these concepts relate to Deleuze's transcendental empiricism in his essay on Deleuze and Bergson, but he does not explicitly show how process of actualization of memory and elan vital in Deleuze's reading of Bergson is parallel, in certain fashion, with actualization in Deleuze's own concept of a life and constitution of subjectivity as I will do here. There will therefore be two main parts to this essay. The first will be an analysis of Deleuze's reading of virtuality and actualization as it is described in Bergsonism. This part will include two sections that correspond to two models of virtuality in Bergson's work: Bergson's theory of memory that is presented in Matter and Memory and elan vital that Bergson describes in Creative Evolution. We will see that actualization has two aspects that establish it as different from realization of possibilities. These two aspects are differentiation and creativity. The second part of essay will show how these two aspects can be seen in Deleuze's conception of a life as it is described primarily in Immanence: Life. This demonstrates influence of Deleuze's reading of Bergson on his own philosophy. But before we can examine how Deleuze interprets Bergson's theories of memory and elan vital and how aspects of these interpretations later get used by Deleuze, we need to clarify what virtual and actual are and how this distinction is different than possible and real. Deleuze is fond of citing Proust's formula when describing virtual. It states that virtual is without being actual, ideal without being abstract (B, 96 and DR, 208).3 The idea that Deleuze is trying to get across with this formula is that virtual is not opposed to real but to actual. The possible, on other hand, is opposed to real. Thus possible has no reality. The virtual, on other hand, is not actual but has reality. Therefore, if our terminology is to be consistent, we must say that virtualities are actualized and possibilities are realized (B, 96). Thus far, virtuality-actuality distinction seems to be merely matter of word choice. But that is not case because actualization and realization are two very different processes. Deleuze states that process of realization is subject to two rules: rule of resemblance and rule of limitation. The rule of resemblance states, the real is supposed to be image of possible that it realizes (B, 97). …