Achieving Unorthodox Deterrence Ability by Bangladesh

Abstract

Apparently, military power and economic resources should determine who wins and who loses and thus, the rational and fundamental principle of conflict has been that power should determine victory in war. Commonly held deterrence theory is based on the balance of military capabilities between the belligerents. Thus, traditional deterrence theory suggests that to deter a potential enemy one has to have stronger military capabilities and thereby, the weak is virtually precluded from the possibility of deterring a considerably stronger opponent. It makes me wonder that if it holds good always, then how a country like Bangladesh will be able to deter its potential big adversaries. Is deterrence possible for Bangladesh without resorting to an arms race? However, recent outcomes of some asymmetric conflicts suggest that supremacy in military capability and economic power are not always the prime determinant of deterrence. Therefore, though geo-strategic and economic realities do not suggest Bangladesh to boost its military arsenal to attain conventional deterrence ability, yet there might be a window of opportunities open for Bangladesh to deter its potential adversaries. Therefore, in my research, I tried to figure out the possibility where a weak actor will able to deter a stronger one by adopting unconventional strategy. I tend to call it ‘Unorthodox Deterrence’.