Accusing the opponent of divinity violations in intergroup conflicts: Bystander reactions to harmfulness and underdog status as a function of the autonomy–divinity discrepancy

Abstract

We experimentally investigated psychological responses of bystanders to violations of moral codes to find out why divinity violations may be more effective for gaining victimhood status than autonomy violations in real-world intergroup conflicts. In particular, we considered how anger versus disgust responses are differentially invoked by violations of autonomy versus divinity ethics. Two experiments compared autonomy versus divinity violations in interaction with two other parameters known to produce different effects: level of harm (Experiment 1) and differential intergroup power (Experiment 2). Overall, we found support for the proposed dissociation in anger versus disgust responses to autonomy versus divinity violations in a way that the anger responses to autonomy violations were amplified but disgust responses to divinity violations were not affected when the moral violation was more harmful and the perpetrator was more powerful than the victim. We discuss the implications of the cognitive processes involved in considering autonomy versus divinity violations, and the functionality for parties to intergroup conflict of accusing the opponent of divinity violations.