Abstract

Abstract Given the standard dominance conditions used in accuracy theories for outright belief, epistemologists must invoke epistemic conservatism if they are to avoid licensing belief in both a proposition and its negation. In ‘Accuracy and epistemic conservatism’ Florian Steinberger charges the committed accuracy monist – the theorist who thinks that the only epistemic value is accuracy – with being unable to motivate this conservatism. I show that the accuracy monist can avoid Steinberger’s charge by moving to a subtly different set of dominance conditions. Having done so, they no longer need to invoke conservatism. I briefly explore some ramifications of this shift.

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