A Two-Stage Evolutionary Game Model for Collaborative Emergency Management Between Local Governments and Enterprises

Abstract

Enterprises play a vital role in emergency management, but few studies have considered the strategy choices behind such participation or the collaborative relationship with the government. This study contended that enterprises have at least three strategies regarding emergency management: non-participation, short-term participation, and long-term participation. We constructed a two-stage evolutionary game model to explore the behavioral evolution rules and evolutionary stability strategies of the government and enterprises, and employed numerical simulation to analyze how various factors influence the strategy selection of the government and enterprises. The results show that if and only if the utility value of participation is greater than 0, an enterprise will participate in emergency management. The evolutionary game then enters the second stage, during which system stability is affected by a synergistic relationship between participation cost, reputation benefit, and government subsidies, and by an incremental relationship between emergency management benefit, government subsidies, and emergency training cost. This study provides a new theoretical perspective for research on collaborative emergency management, and the results provide important references for promoting the performance of collaborative emergency management.