The tripartite evolutionary game of enterprises' green production strategy with government supervision and people participation

Abstract

Government supervision and people participation play vital roles in enterprises' green production strategy, but few studies have considered the strategy choices behind government supervision and people's participation. This study contended that whether an enterprise adopts the green production strategy is influenced not only by its responsible attitude facing social responsibility but also by the following two factors, the intensity of government supervision and whether people choose to participate in supervision or not when facing the enterprise adopting the green production strategy or not. We constructed a tripartite evolutionary game model to explore the behavioral evolution rules and evolutionary stability strategies of government supervision, people participation, and enterprises' green production. Then we employed numerical simulation to analyze how various factors influence the strategy selection of the government, people, and enterprises. The results show that if the utility values of government supervision and people participation are greater than 0, the enterprises will adopt the green production strategy. The system stability is affected by a synergistic relationship between participation cost, reputation benefit, and government subsidies, and an incremental relationship between enterprises' green production benefit, government subsidies, people's reported bonus, and enterprises' green production cost. This study provides a new theoretical perspective for research on government supervision, people participation, and enterprises' green production strategy, and the results provide important references for improving the enterprises' green production and urban environmental management.