A truthful dynamic combinatorial double auction model for cloud resource allocation

Abstract

Dynamic auction-based resource allocation models require little global price information, are decentralized and suitable for the distributed systems like cloud computing. For the cloud computing market, we proposed a Truthful Dynamic Combinatorial Double Auction (TDCDA) model to improve the social welfare and resource utilization. In our model, multiple cloud service providers and cloud users bid for various resources in a dynamic environment. We adopted a payment scheme to ensure truthfulness for all participants, which motivates bidders to reveal their true preferences. Since the combinatorial auction allocation with goal of economic efficiency is NP-hard, we developed a greedy mechanism to achieve the approximately efficient solution. Considering both parties’ interests and the resource scarcity, this model also ensures fairness and balances resource allocation. The proposed model is proven to be approximately efficient, incentive compatible, individually rational and budget-balanced. Simulation results show that the model not only achieves economic efficiency, but also improves resource allocation and meets resource needs for more cloud users.