Abstract

The most enigmatic aspect of consciousness is the fact that it is felt, as a subjective sensation. The theory proposed here aims to explain this particular aspect. The theory encompasses both the computation that is presumably involved and the way in which that computation may be realized in the brain’s neurobiology. It is assumed that the brain makes an internal estimate of an individual’s own evolutionary fitness, which can be shown to produce a special, distinct form of causation. Communicating components of the fitness estimate (either for external or for internal use) requires inverting them. Such inversion can be performed by the thalamocortical feedback loop in the mammalian brain, if that loop is operating in a switched, dual-stage mode. A first (nonconscious) stage produces forward estimates, whereas the second (conscious) stage inverts those estimates. It is argued that inversion produces another special, distinct form of causation, which is spatially localized and is plausibly sensed as the feeling of consciousness.

Highlights

  • The terms ‘consciousness’ and ‘conscious’ have various meanings. They may refer to the state of being awake, the process of gaining access to certain facts as they affect the senses or are retrieved from memory, and the subjective sensation associated with experiencing

  • If ui is part of the physical world, such as a general visual scene, ûi may have to be produced by indirect means, using learned conventions that are understood by both sender and receiver. This applies to other complex communications, for instance, when social situations or language is involved. How such conventions can be gradually learned is beyond the scope of this article, because we focus here on primordial consciousness

  • The theory explained above proposes that consciousness is equivalent to sensing the distinct, partly autonomous cause that arises when an individual prepares to communicate estimated aspects of its own evolutionary fitness

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Summary

Introduction

The terms ‘consciousness’ and ‘conscious’ have various meanings. They may refer to the state of being awake (as in ‘regaining consciousness’), the process of gaining access to certain facts as they affect the senses or are retrieved from memory (as in ‘becoming conscious of something’), and the subjective sensation associated with experiencing (e.g. when feeling pain or joy, and when undergoing a visual experience). Edelman and Tononi (2000) propose that a loop connecting thalamus and cortex forms a dynamic core of functional neural clusters, varying over time This core is assumed to integrate and differentiate information in such a way that consciousness results (for an elaborate theory along these lines, see Oizumi et al 2014). The theory of consciousness that is proposed in the present study takes a somewhat unusual approach, as it first constructs a stochastic causal mechanism that plausibly produces something distinct that may be experienced. Does it conjecture which neural circuits in the brain are good candidates for the mechanism’s implementation, and how that could be tested. What is meant by the latter should become clear below

Preview of the explanation
An internal estimate of evolutionary fitness
Components of X and F
Enhancing fitness by communicating one’s estimates
An algorithm for inverting the unknown
From monologue to dialogue and internal dialogue
Neurobiological interpretation: a two‐cycle thalamocortical loop
C Cortex
The distinct cause that feels like consciousness
10 Discussion and prospect
Full Text
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