A Theory of Allocation of Time in Markets for Labour and Marriage

Abstract

This paper analyzes the interdependence between labor and marriage markets. It is argued that market conditions concerning marriage influence the value of time in the home. According to this economic view marriage involves an exchange of household labor between individual men and women. Wages in labor markets affect marital behavior and conditions in the markets for household labor influence labor supply. Single persons must decide whether to marry and if so how much work to invest and employ in the framework of marriage. In monogamous societies marriage tends to occur when a man demands the amount of household labor a woman wants to supply and a woman demands the amount of labor supplied by the man. However changing outside factors can disrupt this equilibrium and produce changes in income redistribution between the spouse new marital labor relations or divorce. This approach diverges from the traditional theory of labor supply in the way the value of time in the home is determined. Awareness that the supply of labor can shift following changes in a market determined wage for household labor opens new avenues for research in labor economics and studies of female labor supply. A change in sex ratio is likely to increase the proportion of women who marry and decrease the number of hours women work outside the home. Group differences in patterns of division of household labor further influence the elasticity of female labor supply. A positive correlation between achievements in markets for labor and household labor can provide an additional explanation for the backward-bending supply of labor. Finally the relative position of husbands and wives in their respective marriage markets has implications for their consumption patterns and fertility. This theory could provide a useful framework for analyzing the consequences of public policy for production reproduction and the distribution of wealth.